Governing hybrid and cloud service architectures: whose control is it
What changes in governance when part of the architecture is somebody else's service.

Cloud computing changes what a security architecture contains, and so what governing it means: part of the stack is no longer built or operated by the organisation that answers for the risk in it. This sheet is about that shift — who owns each control once part of the architecture is somebody else’s, what is inherited, and what must still be re-verified.
The answer is not a new control but a vocabulary and a division of ownership: a model that says what is being bought, roles that say who sits on each side, and a control mapping that says which part of each control the organisation still owns.
The model is the vocabulary of the decision
The definition is short and enumerative: “Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model is composed of five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models.” (lines 97–101). The five are on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity and measured service; the three service models are Software, Platform and Infrastructure as a Service; the four deployment models are private, community, public and hybrid (lines 105, 109, 113, 121 and 126; 134, 142 and 158; 165, 169, 174 and 177). Its governance value is that each service model states where consumer control stops — under IaaS the consumer “has control over operating systems, storage, and deployed applications” (lines 161–163) — so the vocabulary of a decision is also the map of what the organisation can still be held to.
The hybrid reality: roles and split perimeters
SP 800-146 defines the hybrid case and the two parties together. Hybrid cloud is “a composition of two or more distinct cloud infrastructures (private, community, or public) that remain unique entities, but are bound together by standardized or proprietary technology that enables data and application portability” (lines 491–494); the “cloud consumer or customer: a person or organization that is a customer of a cloud” (lines 502–503) sits opposite the “cloud provider or provider: an organization that provides cloud services” (line 508). The division is physical before it is contractual: an outsourced private cloud has “two security perimeters, one implemented by a cloud consumer … and one implemented by a provider” (lines 977–979), and “the security of data and processing … depends on the strength and availability of both security perimeters” (lines 980–982). Governance follows that seam: the organisation manages the perimeter it implements and must vouch for the one it does not.
The control-side answer: one framework for the relationship
ISO/IEC 27017 is the control-side form of the same division. Its store page states that it “provides guidance for implementing information security controls in cloud services. It builds on ISO/IEC 27002 by adding cloud-specific guidance and additional controls for both cloud service customers and cloud service providers” (lines 12–14) and that it “helps organizations address security risks that arise from the shared nature of cloud computing”, clarifying how controls “can be applied across customer and provider environments … where responsibilities, infrastructure and operational activities are divided between multiple parties” (lines 15–18). It “applies to all cloud deployment models, including public, private and hybrid cloud environments” (lines 19–20) and offers “a common security framework for cloud service relationships” (line 24). The current edition is ISO/IEC 27017:2026, Edition 2 (line 9); the 2015 first edition is withdrawn (line 38).
Whose control is it: retained, inherited, re-verified
SP 800-53 Rev. 5 gives the ownership question a name. A common control is one “whose implementation results in a capability that is inheritable by multiple systems or programs … developed, implemented, assessed, authorized, and monitored by an internal or external entity other than the entity responsible for the system” (lines 1899–1903). For controls sourced entirely from another organisation, SA-9 states the limit: the organisation “has no direct control over the implementation of the required controls or the assessment of control effectiveness” (lines 17884–17885), while “The responsibility for managing risks … remains with authorizing officials” (lines 17888–17889). What is inherited is protection, not proof, and it can lapse: a change in the provider’s service is a change in the organisation’s architecture, so the controls relied on must be re-confirmed rather than assumed to persist.
the shared stack, as the organisation must model it
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retained controls the organisation implements -> owned, evidenced, tested here
inherited controls another party implements -> rests on that party's assurance
re-verified inherited controls the organisation -> evidence sought or obtained,
must still confirm are effective never assumed from the contract
The legal form of the duty
When a regulator installs the duty, it installs it at the top. DORA’s recital 65 states that the monitoring of ICT third-party risk is “formalised through the adoption by the financial entity’s management body of a dedicated ICT third-party risk strategy” (line 148); responsibility never transfers to the provider, so the strategy that manages the dependency belongs to the body that answers for the entity. Third-party and supply-chain risk as a domain, and programme governance across many dependencies, are separate sheets.
The conceptual error is to read a contract as a control: a provider’s certification and service levels are inputs to the organisation’s judgement, not substitutes. Governing a hybrid architecture means keeping three lists straight — retained, inherited and re-verified — and knowing which of the three a contract sentence covers.
Level and prerequisites
L5 — specialist: the sheet takes the lower levels’ vocabulary and processes as given and asks the integration question above them — who owns each control once the stack is shared, what is inherited, and what must be re-verified for another party’s part. Prerequisites: the L1 vocabulary of a control designed, implemented and verified; the L2 records for owner, custodian and service owner; the L3 processes for security requirements for external services and for supplier evaluation; and the L4 distinction between documentary conformity and operational effectiveness.
Where to go next
- Knowledge — the Knowledge register this sheet belongs to.
- Cybersecurity Governance — the macro-area.
- Security governance foundations — the node this sheet sits in.
References
- NIST — SP 800-145, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing — the model, its five essential characteristics, three service models and four deployment models, and the service-model boundaries of consumer control.
- NIST — SP 800-146, Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations — the hybrid cloud definition, the consumer/customer and provider roles, and the two security perimeters of an outsourced private cloud.
- ISO — ISO/IEC 27017:2026 store page — guidance for implementing controls in cloud services, the additional guidance and controls for customers and providers, applicability across deployment models, and the current edition’s status.
- NIST — SP 800-53 Rev. 5 — common, system-specific and hybrid controls and their inheritance, and the SA-9 external-system-services control and its discussion.
- EU — Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA) — recital 65 on the management body’s adoption of the ICT third-party risk strategy.